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ABSTRACT
Despite much recent interest in a consumption tax, the Treasury
Department's November 1984 tax plan proposes to adopt carefully
coordinated features of a more comprehensive income tax,includingthe
indexation of interest, depreciation, andcapitalgains.TheMay1985
White House proposal would retain some of these indexing provisions.
Thispaperlooks at the incentives under alternative tax regimes to make
marginal investments in the corporate sector, noncorporate sector, and
in owner—occupied housing.Itfinds thatthecurrent system is
characterized by effective tax rates thatincreasewith inflation for
some assets and decrease with inflation for other assets. Overall rates
fall with inflation, and the corporate tax is completely offset by
credits, allowances, and deductions. Under the Treasury or White House
plans,thecorporate tax re—emerges, effectivetax rates are








Public finance economists in recentyears haveexhibited
progressively less interest in the equity and efficiency properties of a
comprehensive income tax, andcorrespondinglymore interest inthoseof
a comprehensive consumption tax.1The discussion has centered around
administrative feasibility, the efficient allocation of resources, and
the insulation of taxes to the interference of inflation. In
particular, a tax on the Haig—Simons definition of income is said to
requirethe administratively difficultindexationofinterest,
depreciation, and capital gains.
Despite this trend, the U.S. Treasury Department in November 1984
announced their proposal to adopt carefully coordinated features of a
more comprehensive tax on income.Their plan, described in Tax Reform
forFairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth, is a "modified flat tax"
inthe sense that it would broaden the base and lower the rates, but it
includes other interesting features such as the partial integration of
corporate and personal taxes through a 50percent deduction for
corporate dividends paid.Perhaps the most innovative and difficult
features of the plan, however, are the attempts to measure a real tax
base through multiple indexing provisions.
These provisions make the original Treasury proposal interesting as
a subject of economic investigation, despite the greater political
viability of the more recent President's Tax Proposals to the Congress
for Fairness, Growth, and Simplicity.This paper investigates, for
1See, for examples, Summers (1981), Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Skinner (1983),
and Fullerton, Shoven, Whalley (1983).— 2—
alternative special cases andassumptions,the investment incentives
afforded by the current tax system andbythese other tax regimes.It
follows Hall and Jorgenson (1967) by finding the user cost of capital or
pretax return that is required for a marginal investment under each
regime.It incorporates all of the tax consequences to the firm that
makes the investment and to the saver who provides the finance.The
difference between the pretax return and the posttax return for each
project is a marginal effective tax rate along the lines of Auerbach and
Jorgenson (1980), Gravelie (1982), or Hulten and Robertson (1984).In
particular, like King and Fullerton (1984), this paper includes all
interactions among corporate taxes, personal taxes, and state and local
property taxes. Like Fullerton arid Henderson (1984), it goes beyond the
corporate sector to include taxation of capital in the noncorporate
sector and in owner—occupied housing.This addition is important
because the corporate sector contains only one--third of the U.S. capital
stock. Another third is in owner—occupied housing while the final third
is in the noncorporate business sector, including rental housing.
The model, described in Section 2, is based on assumptions of
perfect competition, factor mobility, and perfect certainty. It assumes
that the firm invests in each asset until the net return just equals the
net cost of funds, using two separate ways to determine that cost.It
shows the effective total tax on the income from investment in any of 36
different assets in 18 different industries. To weight these marginal
rates together for a given tax regime, it takes an equiproportional— 3—
increase in all assets and in all personal savings. The model in this
paper can accorrunodate any indexed or unindexed provisions for
depreciation, interest, or capital gains.It is also generalized to
allow alternative dividend provisions.
While the proposals involve sweeping changes to fringe benefits,
charitable contributions, arid other deductions, this paperconcentrates
on the provisions that would affect taxes on income from capital.
Section 3 outlines the seven major provisions investigated here,
including: 1) the reduction of the corporate rate from 46 to 33 percent,
2) the reduction of personal rates to three brackets of 15, 25, and 35
percent, 3) the elimination of the 60 percent capital gains exclusion
and indexation of basis, 4) the 50 percent dividend deduction, 5) the
indexation of interest, 6) the repeal of investment tax credits, and 7)
the indexation of allowances for economic depreciation.
For current law, the results in Section 4 may be summarized under
three main points.First, the marginal effective total tax rate is
about 30percent, lower than previous estimates for the corporate
sector alone, and much lower than the70 percent average effective
total tax rate found by Feldstein, Dicks—Mireaux, and Foterba (1983)
Second, the corporate tax is found to add nothing to the overall rate on
marginal investment, because the expected tax is completely offset by
credits, allowances, and interest deductions. It does not collect
revenue from these marginal investments but still distorts their
allocation.Third, as inflaton increases, some effective rates rise
2Theaverage effective tax rate takes observed taxes as a fraction of
current capital income. Fullerton (1984) reviews alternative definitions
of effective tax rates, and explains some of the differences among them.—4--
because of historical cost depreciation and others fall because the
corporate rate for nominalinterestdeductions exceeds the personal rate
for nominal interest receipts. Overall, taxes fall with inflation, in
contrast to results of Feldstein and Summers (1979).
Three points also may be made about the Treasury proposal. First,
under almost any set of assumptions, the corporate tax would re—emerge
and thus raise effective tax rates.Second, however, the plan would
significantly level the tax treatment of different assets.It would
eliminate subsidies to equipment and debt financed investment, and it
would reduce the currently high rates -on nondepreciable assets and
equity financed investments.Third, the Treasury plan would virtually
eliminate the dependence of effective tax rates on inflation.
Finally, the White Houseplanwould retain some of the current
advantages for equipment.Effective rates in the corporate sector are
not as high as under the Treasury plan, so intersectoral distortions
might be less. The White House plan also eliminates most of the current
dependence on inflation.
2. A Model of Investment Incentives
To derive a user cost of capital formula like that of Halland
Jorgenson(1967), consider a perfectly competitive firmcontemplatinga
new investment in a world with no uncertainty.Assume the firm has
sufficient tax liability to takeassociatedcredits and deductions, and—5—
thzitit doesnot resell the asset.3 The aquisition cost is q, but an
investment tax credit at rate k reduces the net cost of the asset to
q(1—k). The rental return on this asset starts at level c,increases
at the constant inflation rate ir,and decreases because of constant
exponential depreciation of the asset at rate ö. Local property tax at
rate w is paid on the asset's value at any point in time, and the
return net of property tax is subject to the corporate income tax at
statutory rate u.These net returns are discounted at the firm's
nominal after-tax discount rate r.The present value of depreciation
allowances perdollarof investment is z,so the present valueoftax
savings is uzq.4 In equilibrium, then, the net outlay must be exactly
matched by the present value of net returns:
r (ir—5)t—rt q(l-k)=j(1—u)(c—wq)e edt + uzq . (1)
0
Thisexpression can be integrated and solved for the rental rate
c/q. Subtraction of ö provides c, the real social rate of return
in the corporate sector, gross of taxbutnet of depreciation:
3Effective rates for an untaxed corporation are shown in section 4.4,
but virtually no data is available on how much investment is undertaken
by such firms or on how long they expect to remain in their loss
position.The effects of uncertainty andimperfect loss offsets are
alsoinvestigated in, for example, Auerbach (1983).
4For a variety of reasons not captured here, firms may not always
minimize their taxes by taking the earliest possible deductions.In
order to concentrate on the taxwedgeand to insure comparability across
tax regimes, however, calculations here assume tax minimizing behavior.
Similarly,firmspay unnecessarytaxes by using FIFO inventory
accounting, but calculations here assume LIFO methods.—6—
C r—itfö
p = (l—k—uz)+w—a . (2)
1 -u
In calculations below, common values are usedforr, it,andu,but
each asset hasaspecific valuefora, k, z, and w.
Ifuand the corporate discount rate are replaced by the
noncorporate entrepreneur's personal marginal taxrate r and
corresponding discount rate, then (2) gives an analogous expressionfor
,:flCthesocial rate of return in the noncorporate sector.Finally,
owner-occupied housing receives no creditor depreciation allowances. A
fraction A of property taxes are deducted at the homeowner's persona].
marginal tax rate and the imputed return is not taxed. Use of the
homeowner's discount rate andanequilibrium condition similar to (1)
provides h, the social rate of return to owner—occupied housing:
=r—it + (1_Arh)w (3)
The next sections describe twoalternativeways to derive the
discount rates for the three sectors, assumingthatfinancial decisions
are separate from real invetment decisions. Priordefinitions wi].l be
useful for both of those alternatives. First, suppose thatI isthe
nominal interest rate and fis the fraction of nominal interest
receipts that is taxed (and of nominal interest paymentsdeducted).5A
5TMS fraction is 1.0 under current law in the U.S., but would be set
in a particular way by the November 1984 Treasury proposal.—7—
fraction Cd of corporate investment is financed by debt, and fof
the nominal interest payments are taxed at the debtholders' personal
marginal rate T. The net return is i(lrdf).
A fractionCre of corporate investment is financed by retained
earnings, and the resulting share appreciation is taxed at the effective
accrued personal capital gains rate rre.Also, let irepresent the
extent to which capital gains are i.ndexed (=1 if the system taxes only
real capital gains, arid i=O if it taxes nominal gains).
The remaining fraction c5 of corporate investment is financed by
new shares, and each dollar of after—corporate-tax return could instead
be distributed as 9dollars of dividends.6This dividend is subject
to personal taxes at rate rns
In the noncorporate sector,
ridof new investment is financed by
debt, and
rieis financed by equity.A fraction hdof housing is
debt, while he is equity. All nominal mortgage interest is deducted
at the homeowner's personal marginal tax raterh.Finally, define
(KC, Knc Kh)as the shares of the capital stock, and (5C,s,sh)
as the net of all tax returns, in the corporate, noncorporate, and owner
occupied housingsectors,respectively. The overall net return Is:
=SK+ SncKr + ghKh (4)
in King (1977),9is the opportunity cost of retentions in terms
of forgone dividends (gross of personal taxes).It is 1.0under
current law, but greater than one where a dividend deduction allows
firms to pay more in dividends than they could retain after tax.— 8—
2.1. Firm Arbitrage
For the standard set of calculations, assume that the firm can
arbitrage between debt andrealcapital, asinBradford andFullerton
(1981).In this case the corporation can savei—ufiby retiring a
unit of debt. Even equity financed marginal investments must then earn
i(1—uf) in equilibrium, because the corporation could always have used
the funds to retire a unit of debt.All nominal net returns are then
discounted at the rate r =i(1—uf),whatever the source of finance.
Before proceeding to the discount rates of the other sectors, the
return net of all taxes in the corporate .sector can be calculated. For
Cd of corporateinvestment, the corporation pays out nominal interest
i,and the net return to debtholders is i(1_rdf). For the fraction
CreIthe return after corporate taxesi(1—uf)results in capital
gainsto the shareholder that are taxed at the rater.Thenet re
return is i(1—uf)(1—r)+ ri. And forcof investment, when re re ns
the net return i(1—uf)is paid out,stockholders receive i(1—uf)9
in dividends.The net return on this fraction of investment is thus







Thetotal effective marginal tax rate inthe corporate sector,
includingall corporate, personal and property taxes, is simply
(pC_sC)/PC, thetax wedge as a fraction of the pretax return.—9---
The noncorporate firm can always deduct a fractionfof nominal
interest at the rate r, so its discount rate is i(i—rf). This is
also thenetreturn to equity financed. investment.The overall net
noncorporate return is then:
=
nd(lTaf)1 + fle[I(l_TncfH — (6)
and the marginal effective total tax rate is (C_5)/p•
Since the Treasury proposal allows the homeowner to deduct all
nominal interest payments, at rate
rh,the discount rate for this
housing isi(lrh). Again, even equity financed marginal investments
must earn this net rate of return, since the homeowner could always have
used the funds to retire a unit of debt instead.Since lenders earn
the overall net return in this sector is:
=hd[i(l_rdf))+ he[I(i_Th)] (7)
The marginal effective total tax rate is
An important point to note is that all of the investors (firms) and
all of the savers (individuals) are tied together through a single
interest rate. The tax rules and relative sizes of different
investments will all help determine the relationships among the pretax
returnsp,the interest rate i,and the posttax returns s. In
particular, the analysis could proceed by choosing i andit,
calculating the p from equations (2) and (3), calculating the
different s from (5)—(7), and then the overall s from (4).—10--
The comparison of different tax regimes, however, requires careful
choices for ceteris paribus assumptions.Thenominalinterest rate is
determined in partbythe rules of the tax regime, so it does not seem
appropriate to fix i across regimes. The pretax returnspcould be
held fixed, but the leveling of different pretax returns is part of the
point of tax reform. For these reasons, calculations start by choosing
s and i.Equations(4)-(7) are then solved for the nominal interest
rate i,and the specified discount rates are usedinequations(2)-(3)
to calculate the pretax returns.However, the constancy ofs should
be viewed as an arbitrary ceteris paribus assumption and not as a result
for open or closed economies in general equilibrium.
2.2. Individual Arbitrage
The model above insures equal rates of return to all activities of
each firm, but it implies different rates of return to the ultimate
savers. A holder of debt in any sector earns i(lrdf), but
noncorporate equity earnsi(l_Tncf)•Equity in the corporate sector
earns less, because it pays both corporate and personal taxes.
In an alternative model, assume thatindividualsactually hold all
of these assets, arid that they arbitrage away any differences in net
rates of return.All assets must then provide the net return that
individuals could earn on their debtholdings:
c nc h
S=s=s=s=a(l_rdf)
— . (8)1 1—
Again,start withanassumption on s, and calculate i simply as
(s+7c)/(1_rf).This interest rate provides the corporation's discount
rate for debt, given by i(1—uf). Retained earnings, however, must earn
a nominal net—of—corporate-tax returnrsuch that the individual's
return r(l_rre)+rre7i exactly matches The solution for r
provides the requisite discount rate.Similarly, new share issues must
earn an r such that r9(l_rns) =i(l_raf).The corporation's single
discount rate is a weighted average of these three:




The noncorporatefirm's debtcostsi(1r0f).andits equity must
earn i(l_rdf)after taxes, because of individual arbitrage. Its





A similarlogicforhomeowners provides their discount rate:
hdji(lTh)I ÷heli(i_Tdf)I' (11)
where all of mortgage interest is deducted, but only fof other
interest income is subject to tax. Again, in this model, all agents are
tied together by the interest rate i.
Clearly, the two models are not consistent with one another.If
individuals do hold different assets and arbitrage away differences in—12—
the:rates atreturn,then a project financed by equity must earn a
hic;hermargi.rilproductthan the same project financed by debt.This
1at-tr scenario can bejustifiedin a perfect certainty model only if
forcom€reason firms must use a given mix of finance.
A more complete theory with risk could probably explain the
simultaneous holding of assets with different rates of return.This
paper abstracts from financial portfolio choice, however, in order to
concentrateon real investment. Firmarbitrage is the standard
assumption, because it is consistent with the segmented equilibrium
suggested by Miller (1977). That is, the returns to the firm are
equalized by arbitrage, and the net returns to debt and equity need not
be equalized if they are held by individuals in different brackets. The
importance of this choice is investigated by showing results for the
alternative assumption of individual arbitrage.
3. Data and Parameters for the U.S.
This section describes the assignment of values to each of the
parameters defined above. For convenience, it starts with capital stock
shares, financing shares, and property tax rates. Other parameters and
features of the tax code are described later in seven subsections:
corporate tax rates, personal tax rates, capital gains, dividends,
interest indexing, investment tax credits, and depreciation.Because
these seven areas correspond to major components of either reform,
current law and proposed changes can be described in each subsection.
First, the stock of each asset used in each industry is derived
from Dale Jorgenson's unpublished estimates.7 These 1977 capital stocks
7See Jorgenson and Sullivan(1981) arid Fraumeni and Jorgenson (1980) for
more detail on the procedures used to make these estimates.—13—
are aggregated to18industries and converted from levels to shares.
Rental and owner-occupied housing estimates are derived from the
February 1981 Survey of Current Business.
Little is known about how firms decide to finance marginal
investments, but this study uses existing proportions. The market value
of outstanding debt and equity are estimated from COMFtJSTAT tapes, and
annual retentions and new share issues are taken from the Flow of
Funds.8 These data indicate that corporations finance 33.7 percent by
debt,61.4 percent by retentions, and 4.9 percent by new shares.
Section 4 shows the sensitivity of results to this assumption.
Even less is known about the financing of noncorporate business,
but the July 1982 Survey of Current Business indicates that the ratio of
interest payments to an estimate of capital income in the noncorporate
sector is almost identical to the same ratio in the corporate sector. A
rough estimate, then, is that noncorporate firms also finance a third of
their investments by debt and two-thirds by equity.
New homes are heavily mortgaged, but the loan to value ratio
typically falls as the house ages.This study considers a permanent
increase in the capital stock, with fixed sources of finance, so a
permanent fraction for debt finance is approximated by total mortgage
debt as a fraction of total market value. Unpublished estimates of the
Census Bureau suggest that thié ratio is again very close to one-third.
The use of identical shares for debt in all three sectors will also
serve to isolate and highlight the tax differences among them.
8More detail on these procedures is provided on page 238 of King and
Fullerton (1984).—14--
Finally, before turning to the seven areas that would be affected
by the proposals, consider the property tax on marginal investment.
This tax is collected by over a thousand local taxing jurisdictions, so
it is difficult to set these tax parameters by looking at the code.
Some jurisdictions may offer special rebates or tax holidays for new
business, but again the appropriate concept is the tax over the life of
the asset. Assuming that new investments will pay the same property tax
on average as existing investments, tax data from the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations and Jorgensonts capital stocks
indicate rates of.00768 for equipment.and inventories,.01126 for
business land and structures, .01550 for public utilities, and .01837
for residential land and structures.
3.1 Corporate Tax Rates
The top federal statutory rate of .46is used for marginal
corporate income, since most all of the corporate capital is held by
firms in this bracket.The weighted average of states top—bracket
rates is .0655, including zeros for states without corporate taxes, and
using personal income to weight the fiftystates.9Accounting for the
deductibility of state taxes' at the federal level, the appropriate value
for u is .46+.0655(1—.46), which equals 49.5 percent.
The Treasury and White House proposals would set a single federal
rate of.33 and maintain the deductibility of state corporate taxes.
For these reforms, u is thus 37.4 percent.
9 ... . . Ajustification is given on page 204 of King and Fullerton (1984).— 15—
3.2 Personal Tax Rates
The marginal investment under consideration is an equiproportionate
increase in all capital stocks, with an equiproportionate increase in
the holdings of all investors. Additional debt and interest income, for
example, would be distributed among debtholders in proportion to their
current debt and interest income. The appropriate marginal tax rate is
thus the average of all debtholders' marginal rates, weighted by their
interest income.
For households, these tax rates were calculated from the TAXSIM
model of the National Bureau of Economic Research.1° Marginal rates for
25,000 households are weighted by each different source of income and
shown in Table 1.Rates under the current law in the first column
indicate that interest recipients are in relatively higher brackets than
wage—earners, while dividend recipients are in higher brackets still.
The 26percent capital gains rate reflects the full taxation of
realized gains, and the 19.5 percent noncorporate rate reflects the
low brackets of many proprietors and partners with losses for tax
purposes.All of these personal tax rates would be reduced by the
Treasury proposal, as shown in the second column. Since that plan would
reduce the top rate bracket proportionately more than other brackets,
however, it reduces the weighted average rate on dividends and capital
gains proportionately more than the rates on other forms of income.
101 am grateful to Lawrence Lindsey for performing all TAXSIM
calculations. See Lindsey and Navratil (1985) for further description
of this model.— 16—
TAXSIM calculations are not yet available for the White House plan, but
the three brackets are very close to those of the Treasury plan.
Federal taxes are not the only personal taxes, and households are
not the only recipients of these income types.In order to include
state income taxes, 5 percentage points are added to each federal rate
of the first column) This percentage reflects the weighted average of
the different states' rates, and the deductibility of state taxes at the
federal level for those who itemize. Six percentage points are added to
the rates in the second column, to reflect the fact that both proposals
would do away with this deductibility.
The personal rate on interest is then adjusted to account for the
taxation of banks, as described in King arid Fullerton (1984, pages 223-
226).The resulting rate for households must then be averaged with a
zero rate for the interest income of nonprofit institutions, arid a .368
rate for the interest income of life insurance companies.This rate
reflects their 46percent statutory rate and their20percent
deduction for reserves under current law.The final estimate for
is.231,as shown in the third column of Table 1.The same average
under the Treasury proposal is.205,as shown in the fourth column.
These rates for Treasury ar& also used for the White House plan.
The household rate on dividends is similarly raised to account for
state taxes and reduced to account for the dividends received by tax—
exempt institutions and insurance companies.The resulting value for
r is.292 under current law and .242 under the proposals.The
ns
11See page 221 of King arid Fullerton (1984).—17—
noncorporaterate is raised by state taxes, but not reduced by any
holdings of institutions. It is .245 and .218 under current law and
the proposals, respectively. The rates for capital gains are discussed
in the next subsection.
The weighted average rate for mortgage interest deductions is .25
at the federal level, raised to .30to account for state taxes.
Itemization is irrelevant, because the homeowner has a choice about how
much to draw from a bank account. Itemization matters for deduction of
property taxes, however, arid the TAXSIM model indicates that about
seventy percent are in fact deducted. Thus TharidAare.30 and
.7 respectively. The proposals would reduce this personal rate to .27
and eliminate deductibility of property taxes (A=0).
3.3 Capita]. Gains
Current law excludes 60 percent of long—term capital gains, arid the
effective tax is approximately halved again by deferral.2 Even after
adding state taxes, the effective rate on accruals is6 percent for
households and 5.2 percent after accounting for tax—exempt
institutions arid insurance companies.On the other hand, current law
taxes nominal capital gains (=0). The Treasury proposal would lower
personal rates and index for inflation, but it would fully tax real
gains when realized.After state taxes, halving for deferral, and
averaging with institutions, T wouldbe .105(with 7=1).The
effect of this change can be seen in equation (5) or (9).
12See King and Fullerton (1984, pages 221—222).— 18—
The white Houseplan taxes50 percent of nominal gains at reduced
personal rates, SO T 5.6percent.After 1991, however, the
investor can choose indexation in place of the exclusion. This model
calculates the inflation rate at which this option would be taken.
3.4 Dividends
Ifthe corporation gives up a dollar of retentions under current
law,it is able to pay one dollar of dividends gross of personal taxes.
Thus 6isone. Suppose instead thatafraction g of dividends are
deductibleagainst the corporate tax. The dollar of retentions
corresponds to 11(1—u)dollarsof before—tax earnings, and if these
earnings were paid out in dividends, then (1-g) of them would be taxed
at rateu.After corporate tax, dividends would be 1/(1—u)times
1—(1—g)u. Thus the dividends per dollar of forgone retentions is6 =
(1-u-Fgu)/(1-u).With u=.374 and half of dividends deductible under
the Treasury proposal, 0would be 1.299.With a ten percent
deduction under the White House plan, 0is 1.060.
The effect of such a change can be seen in equation (5) for the
case of firm arbitrage, where a larger dividend means that the recipient
earns a higher return.1n equation (9) for individual arbitrage, it
means that the firm does not need to earn as much to provide the
required after—tax return to the saver.
3.5 Interest Indexing
Nominal interest income currently is taxed in the U.S., arid sof
is set to one. Infact,the world has very little experience with—19—
attempts to index income, especially interest income.Because the
Treasury would undertake several other types of indexing, however, it
may be important to deal with the indexation of interest as well.Tax
shelters could become even more profitable if high-bracket individuals
were able to deduct nominal interest payments while being taxed only on
the real part of their income from other investments.
The Treasury recognizes the administrative difficulties of trying
to measure real interest income or expense, arid so it suggests a more
practical procedure that is intended to have approximately the same
effect. By knowing the inflation rate ir,andassuming a 6 percent
real return at the outset, it can estimate the inflationary portion of
the nominal interest by 7r/(.06+lr).With4percent inflation, for
example, the excluded part is.4, and fis set to .6 in equations
(5)—(11). All of mortgage interest is still deductible.
Incentive effects of this system include the real effects of the
approximation used by the Treasury.To separate the effects of this
approximation from the effects of interest indexing alone, calculations
are also performed for a more conceptually "pure" version of interest
indexing. Mortgage interest is left fully deductible, but equations (5)
through (11) are rewritten such that exactly(i—i)is deductible to
the corporation and taxable to the individual.As seen below, the
Treasury Department's approximation works very well when the real
interest rate is in fact close to .06, but not otherwise.
The White House would not index interest income or expense.—20—
3.6 InvestmentTax Credits
Inthe 1960sarid70!s,investmenttax credits were used
:nIytostimulateorslowthe macroeconomy.As a temporary
dtv::e,they mayhave beenlimitedto equipment because ofthe shorter
time required toorder andbuysuch assets. Sincethey have become
nermanent,however,investment tax credits have provided strong
incentive forbusinesses to shift away from the otherwise efficient mix
o assets.Current law provides a six percent credit for automobiles,a
tenpercentcreditfor other equipment,a ten percent credit for public
utility structures, andno credit for buildings, inventories, or land.
Boththe Treasury and the White House plan would repeal these credits.
3.7 Depreciation
Great potential for noneutrailties arise because different assets
depreciate at many different rates, while tax codes tend to simplify by
grouping assets into few categories for depreciation allowances.In
order to capture these nonneutralities, it is important to include many
diverse assets inthemodel. Table 2 lists the 36 assets used in this
study,including20 kinds of equipment and14types of structures,
followed by inventories and land.This is a very comprehensive list,
butit stillexcludes intangible assets such as goodwill or technical
knowledge. The economic depreciation rates 6 are estimated by Hulten
and Wykoff (1981) and shown in the first column of Table 2. These range
fromahigh of .333for autos to a low of .019forcertain
buildings. Inventories and land do not depreciate.
The second column of Table 2 shows the investment taxcredits
discussed above, aridthethird column shows the lifetimes currently
availableunderthe Accelerated Cost Recovery System (ACRS). Autos areC€rec:teci over 3years,otherequipment over5years, public
utilitystructures over 10 or15 years, andother structures over
:8 years.Allowances over these lifetimes can bereadfrom tables in
thelaw,but equipmentand publicutilities receive allowances basedon
150 percent of declining balance with a switch at the optimal time to
straight line. The depreciation basis is reduced by half the investment
tax credit. Other structures receive allowances based on 175 percent
ofdecliningbalance with an optimal switch to straight line.
These allowances are high relative to economic depreciation, but
they are fixed in nominal terms.At moderate inflation rates, their
real present value may be less than that of economic depreciation. The
use of a nominal discount rate accounts for the fact that allowances are
based on historical cost. The calculation of z also accounts for the
half—year convention, annual allowances, arid continuous discounting.1
3
The Treasury proposes tosetallowances as closely as possible to
estimates of economic depreciation, indexed for inflation. In fact, for
their Real Cost Recovery System (RCRS), they uses the Hulten—Wykoff
estimates to group together similar assets into seven classes.Each
class has an exponential rate for allowances, and a year in which all
remaining basis may be deducted.A real discount rate is used to
capture the indexing of allowances.14
13The exact formula for zis shown in King and Fullerton (1984, page
211) .Analogousformulae are used for the Real Cost Recovery System and
the Capital Cost Recovery System.
14For comparability with current law, the formula forz under RCRS
assumes that the asset is purchased at mid-year.It uses continuous
discounting at the allowed exponential rate until the close—out year,
and continuous discounting of the last year's deduction over the course
of that year. The Treasury's grouping of the assets listed in Table 2
may be seen on page 161 of Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and
EconomicGrowth.—22--
These allowances closely match the estimated real rates of
depreciation.Since all remaining basis is deducted inthe close-out
year,however,allowancesareslightly accelerated relative to the
estimatedexponential rates. Moreover, this near neutrality is based on
theestimates of economic depreciation.If5aremismeasured in some
way, then marginaleffective tax rates are mismeasured.
The White Houseproposesa Capital Cost Recovery System (CCRS) with
six asset classes, higher exponential allowances, a switch to straight
line at the optimal time, and indexation for inflation,Deductions are
not bunched in the close—out year as in RCRS.1
4. Results
In the first subsection below, one set of assumptions i.e usedto
provide detailed results for the 36 assets in the model, and for 18
private industries.In order to see the impact and importance of
indexing interest, depreciation, and capital gains, each of seven
components are introduced one at a time and investigated separately.
Later subsections show the sensItivity of results to assumptions about
arbitrage, the net rate of return, the inflation rate, and financing
proportions.Detailed calculationsare available for each special case,
but later tables save space by aggregating the results separately over
the 20 kinds of equipment, the 5 public utility structures, and the
9 otherstructures.
15Calculations use the formula on page 211 of King andFullerton (1984),
witha real discount rate.The WhiteHouse grouping of assets may be
seenon page 145ofThe Presidentts Tax Proposals to the Congress for
Fairness,Growth, and Simplicity.—23—
4.1 Detailed Results for the Standard Assumptions
The fourth column of Table 2 shows current marginal effective total
tax rates in the corporate sector for each asset, including corporate
taxes, personal taxes, and property taxes. These rates are negative for
all20types of equipment, because the expected tax on the future
income from a marginal investment is more than offset by the combination
of investment tax credits, accelerated depreciation allowances, and
interest deductions. These credits and deductions are taken against the
tax that the corporation would otherwise have to pay on its previous
investments.Assuming that the firm has sufficient tax liability to
make use of these benefits, the subsidy at the corporate level is in
fact large enough to offset the personal and property taxes as well as
corporate taxes.
Structures have rates between 25 and 45 percent, while
inventories and land are taxed at 42 and 45 percent, respectively.
The property tax represents the only difference between these last two
assets, but note that interest deductions still reduce their effective
rates well below the combination of statutory tax rates.
The fifth column of Table 2 indicates that the Treasury proposal
would indeed measure and tax economic income, subject to the caveats
mentioned in the previous section. With economic depreciation
allowances and repeal of differential investment tax credits, equipment
would be taxed at levels close to those of structures, inventories, and
land.Misailocationsamong these assets would diminish accordingly.—24—
The last columnshows the White House plan, where allowances are re-
acceirated, particularly for equipment.The repeal of investment tax
creditsinsures positive rates on all assets, however.
Using these rates for the 36 assets and weighting by the stock of
eachasset employed in each industry, Table 3 provides an estimate of
the marginal effective total tax rate in each of 18 private industries.
The low rate inservicesreflects the high weight on equipment and on
thenoncorporate sector, while the low rate in real estate reflects the
average of owner—occupied housing and noncorporate rental housing. All
industriest rates would be increased by. the Treasury plan, and most
would be increased by the White House plan, but the reasons are best
explained by looking at component parts.
4.2 Components of the Treasury Proposal
As a basis of comparison, results for current law are summarized in
the first column of Table 4, where the assets are aggregated separately
for equipment, structures, public utilities, inventories, and land. The
corporate sector rates reflect those in Table 2, where equipment was
subsidized and other assets were differentially taxed.The overall
31.1percent rate in the oorporate sector is not much different from
the 30.7 percent rate in the noncorporate sector, because the high
statutory corporate rate works two ways:it is used to tax the income
from equity financed investments, but to deduct nominal interest on debt
financed investment.
The 17.2 percent rate on owner—occupied housing reflects only the
state and local property taxes, reduced to the degree that these taxes—25--
are deducted at the federal level. Also, homeowners deduct interest at
a 30 percent rate, while the average interest recipient is taxed at a
marginal rate of 23 percent. All sectors are averaged together to get
the 263 percent overall rate.
The effect of interest indexingbyitself can be seen in the second
column, where subsidies to equipment are removed and corporate taxes
generally are increased. Noncorporate rates change little, because the
24.5 percent rate for proprietors' interest deductions is very close to
the 23 percent rate on interest receipts.Only the owner—occupant is
still allowed to deduct nominal interest payments, so the total rate in
this sector falls from 17 to 15 percent.
One interesting effect of this reform is demonstrated by the value
ofi shown in the bottom row o.f Table 4.Under current law, with 4
percent inflation, the nominal interest rate must be 13.16 percent in
order for investors to pay tax on nominal interest and still receive
their fixed 5 percent real net return. When investors are taxed on a
fraction f of nominal interest, a fraction designed to approximate the
real component, the nominal rate only needs to be11.58 percent to
provide the same real net return.16
The Treasury Department's approximation formula recognizes the
difficulty of trying to measure andtaxreal interest income, but the
16These calculations use the assumption of firm arbitrage, butthesame
point is more obvious with the alternative of individual arbitrage.In
that case s =i(l_rdf)
-ir,so imust be (s+lr)/(l_rdf). With no
change tosor ir,thereform would simply decreasefand thus
decrease the nominal interest rate. This point bears no relation to the
effect of inflation on nominal interest, an effect discussed below.26—
thirdcolumn of this table shows the results of themoreconceptual
e:perirnent of pure" interest indexing. Effective tax rates are in fact
very close to those of Treasury's approximation, but the real interest
rate inthismodelisnot far from the 6percent rate assumedby
Treasury. In other experiments, the inflation rate was varied from zero
to 10 percent. Effective tax rates all start out at the same place, but
those for Treasury indexing increase about twice as fast as those for
pure indexing (while both types increase relative to current law with
its nominal interest deductions).
The biggest single step that could be taken toward leveling diverse
effective tax rates would be the repeal of the investment tax credit
that applies to equipment and public utility structures only. The
fourth column of Table 4 shows this component by itself, where rates for
equipment rise from —.183 to 4.361, and the overall corporate sector
rate rises from.311to.400.The results of this study could be
used to construct for each tax regime a general equilibrium measure of
thewelfarecost from misallocation of capital, along the lines of
Harberger (1966) .Absentsuch a measure, the penultimate row of the
table shows a rough indicator of such effects, the weighted standard
deviation of pretax returis (p)across all assets in all three
sectors.17The repeal of investment taxcreditswould reduce this
measure by as much as any other component, from.0171 to .0130.
Remaining variation stems from accelerated depreciation allowances and
the nontaxation of owner—occupants' imputed net rents.
'7me weighted standard deviation shows potential for interasset
distortions only.Since effective tax rates are increased by ITC
repeal, intertemporal distortions may offset interasset welfare gains.—27—
The next component would fully tax all realized capital gains but
index the basis for inflation.This model does not capture potential
for increased retentions, realizations, tax certainty, or horizontal
equity.It does capture the reduced dependence of taxes on inflation,
as shown below.Effective tax rates in the fifth column are slightly
lower than those of the current law, indicating the important result
that indexing is slightly more valuable to taxpayers than the loss of
their 60 percent exclusion, even at only 4percent inflation. As
seen for the White House plan below, investors choose indexing over the
exclusion when the inflation rate reaches 4 percent.
The 50 percent dividend deduction in the sixth column shows very
little reduction of tax rates (and only in the corporate sector) .The
10 percent dividend deduction would change rates even less. The effect
of this deduction is limited to the total tax on new share issues,
however, a small 5 percent fraction of total corporate financing. The
dividend deduction might provide a substantial benefit to existing
retentions within the firm, but it does not apply to a marginal
investment financed by retained earnings: the rate of return to
shareholders in this case involves taking the later dividends relative
to the currently forgone dividends, and the deduction would apply
equally to both.18The dividend deduction might encourage firms to
change their financing shares, however, as discussed below.
The reduction of the corporate rate from 46 to 33 percent also
would have little effect on tax rates, as shown in the seventh column of
18This argument does not depend uponqbeing less than one as in
Auerbach (1979), Bradford (1981), and King (1977).— 28--
Table 4.The reduced tax on equity is offset by the reduced advantage
of nominal interest deductions. Under the assumption of firmarbitrage,
however, the high corporate rate drives 5cwell below Similar
effective taxratesmean thatthevarious c are well below the
nc
corresponding p .Thefall an the corporate rate also reduces th.s
discrepancy and thus substantially reduces the standard deviation of the
p's shown near the bottom row- of the table.
19
Finally, the reduction of personal tax rates would reduce
marginal effective total tax rates by a couple of percentage points in
both the corporate and noncorporate sectors. The nearly unchanged rate
for owner-occupants in the eighth column of Table 4 does not include
their loss of property tax deductibility.
In broader perspective, the effect of each component depends on
whether it is introduced by itself, as shown here, or in combination
with other components. As expected, some components by themselves would
raise effective tax rates while others would reduce them. At least for
this model with the standard set of parameters, however, the tax—
increasing effects are relatively large for interest indexing aridrepeal
of investment tax credits. Tax—reducing effects are small for capital
gains changes andthedivddend deduction, and nonexistant for the
corporate rate reduction.The next section showstherelative size of
these components for other assumptions.
19Table 4 does not show RCRSorCCRS by themselves, because the p for
some assets are negative.In this case the tax wedge (p-s)is still
negative, but the division by p changes the sign of the effective tax
rate andmakesit difficult to interpret at best.Thesedepreciation
rules may work well with other components of the two tax plans, but they
enlarge the subsidy for some equipment when combined with the current
investmenttax credits and nominalinterest deductions.—29--
4.3 Alternative Models and Assumptions
Results for the standard assumptions are reproduced in the first
three columns of Table 5.With firm arbitrage anda5percent net
return, theTreasuryplan would put all corporate assets into the40
percent tax rate range and increase the economy's rate from 26.3to
33.5 percent.The owner—occupied housing rate increases from 17 to
22 percent with the loss of property tax deductibility; the weighted
standard deviation of pretax returns falls from .0171 to .0117.
Corporate sector rates are raised by the White House plan with
these assumptions, but they are still lower than for the Treasury plan.
Interasset differences are greater than under the Treasury, but inter—
sectoral differences are less. The latter effect seems to dominate, as
the weighted standard deviation falls to .0093.
Results for individual arbitrage are shown in the next three
columns.With this assumption under current law, effective tax rate
estimates are higher for all assets in such a way that disparites remain
but equipment is no longer subsidized.However, the more uniform
treatment of different investors under the Treasury and White House
plans means that estimates of effective tax rates are much less
sensitive to this change of assumption.Still the Treasury plan is
found to increase marginal effective total tax rates? from 38 to 44
percent in the corporate sector and from 30 to 34 percent overall.
With this assumption, however, the White House plan would reduce
the current rate in the corporate sector from38to36percent.-30-
Thisplan might therefore increase or decrease effective rates,
depending on assumptions.
Theassumptionof a 5percent net return is tested in the last
three columns, for the case of firm arbitrage.With a 3 percent net
return instead, current rates vary from —59 percent for equipment to
+47 percent for structures,The Treasury and White House plans would
still tend to equalize effective tax rates, but at higher levels.
One of the striking features of current law is the sensitivity of
taxes to inflation. This sensitivity is demonstrated for some assets in
20
Figure1, wheretaxes on corporate land and inventories fall with
inflation because of nominal interest deductions (at a corporate rate
greater than the personal rate on interest receipts),2 1Taxes on
depreciable assets increase with inflation because of historical cost
depreciation, despite the same interest deductions. Accelerated
allowances for equipment may have been intended to offset high inflation
of the past decade, but the impact of low inflation is dramatically
demonstrated in Figure 1.
The most innovative features of the Treasury plan were designed
specifically to deal with the scattered effects of inflation shown in
20 . ... .
Theassumption of tax—minimizing behavior by farms includes the strong
assumption of LIFO inventory accounting, as described in section 2.
Under FIFO accounting, inflation would increase inventory taxes.
21The 5 percent real net rate of return is held fixed, so the nominal
interest rate must increase by more than the rate of inflation.See
Darby (1975). An alternative assumption might use empirical estimates
of the effect of inflation on actual interest rates, but then s and
would change simultaneously and calculations would not isolate the
effects of alternative r.For effective tax rates with alternative
versions of Fisher's Law, see Bradford and Fullerton (1981).—31—
Figure 1.When indexation of interest, depreciation and capital gains
are combined with the other features of the Treasury proposal, Figure 2
shows that inflation has virtually no remaining effect.It reduces
taxes on owner—occupied housing because of nominal mortgage interest
deductions, but property taxes represent the major remaining difference
among corporate assets.
The White House plan would drop interest indexing, but Figure 3
shows that this feature is less important when the corporate rate is
reduced to a level more similar to the rate at which nominal interest
receipts are taxed. Effective rates only fall slightly with inflation.
Figure 3 also shows how CCRS retains some corporate asset differences.
4.4 Other Special Cases
If individuals and firms are mobile and fully informed, then the
Tiebout (1956) Hypothesis would suggest that the property tax is not a
distorting tax at all but a voluntary payment for local public services.
Effective tax rates for the three sectors and for the whole economy are
shownfor the standard parameters inthe first panel of Table 6 and for
the case with no property tax in the second panel. These calculations
indicate that property taxes make a big difference, constituting most of
the total tax rate under current law and the White House proposal, and
almost half of the total tax rate under the Treasury plan.
Property taxes represent the only tax on owner-occupied housing, a
sector which makes up one—third of the total capital stock.Without
them, owner-occupied housing is subsidized by the fact that the—32---
homeownerstratefor interest deductions exceeds the personal rate on
interest receipts.If the property tax is not distorting, then the
total tax on combined income from capital in the United States is only
nine percent of the pretax return.
Many investments that qualify for credits and deductions are under—
taken by start—up firms that have not yet turned a profit, or by older
firmswithindefinite loss positions.For the extreme case where
credits are never used and income from the investment is never taxed,
effective rates are shown in the third panel of Table 6. These
calculations also represent the effects of corporate tax repeal (without
trying to tax corporate income at the personal level). The current rate
in the corporate sector is only slightly reduced from the standard case,
indicating that the corporate tax is completely offset by credits,
allowances, and nominal interest deductions.22 It may distort
allocation without collecting any revenue from the marginal investment.
Under the Treasury and White House plans, the corporate tax does collect
revenue at the margin.Changes in the other sectors are caused by
changes in the nominal interest rate.
Finally, Stiglitz (1973) has suggested that investments can be
totally debt financed at the margin.This case is presented in the
fourth panel of Table 6, where the entire corporate sector is now
subsidized at a 27.5percent rate (despite positive personal and
property taxes).Debt makes the least impact under the Treasury plan,
where interest deductions and receipts are indexed.
a seven percent rate of inflation, these deductions more than
offset the corporate tax.—33—
At the other extreme, a marginal corporate investment financed
eritireybyequity would pay 55percent under current law, 49
percent under the Treasury plan, and 47 percent undertheWhite House
plan,asshown in the fifth panel.Theseplansreducethe tax on
equity, because the corporate rate reduction and dividend deduction more
than compensate f or the loss of investment tax credits.
Under current law, the tax on equity (.553) is clearly greater than
the tax on debt (-.275).The Treasury plan would reduce this disparity
most, raising the tax on debt (to .306) and reducing the tax on equity
(to .491). It would reduce distortions in financial decisions
accordingly.Corporations might shift toward greater use of equity
finance, but they would not reduce their taxes in doingso.Under the
Treasury plan with 10 percent less debt and 10 percent greater new
share issues, the total rate on new investment in the corporate sector
increases from 43.1 percent to 44.6 percent.
5. Conclusion
Despite much recent interest in a consumption tax, the Treasury
Department's November 1984 tax plan proposes to adopt carefully
coordinated features of a more comprehensive income tax, including the
indexation of interest, depreciation, and capital gains. President
Reagan's plan is similar, but it would re—accelerate depreciation
allowances and drop the indexation of interest. This paper looks at the
incentives under alternative tax regimes to make marginal investments in
the corporate sector, noncorporate sector, and in owner—occupied—34--
housing. Itfinds that the current system is characterized by effective
tax rates that increase with inflation for some assets anddecreasewith
inflation for other assets. Overall rates fall with inflation, and the
corporate tax is completely offset by credits, allowances, and
deductions.Under the Treasury plan, the corporate tax re—emerges,
effective tax rates are considerably more uniform, and the interference
of inflation is virtually eliminated. tinder the White House plan,
effective tax rates in the corporate sector might rise or fall from
current law, depending on assumptions. This plan reduces intersectora).
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Corporate Sector Tax Rate .311 .431 .344
Noricorporate Sector Tax Rate .307 .327 .310
Owner-Occupied Housing Tax Rate .172 .217 .230
Overall Tax Rate .263 .335 294
B.No Property Tax
Corporate Sector Tax Rate .136 .350 .214
Noncorporate Sector Tax Rate .185 .204 .180
Owner-Occupied Housing Tax Rate -.059 -.134 -.054
Overall Tax Rate .094 .184 .121
C. No Corporate Income Tax
Corporate Sector Tax Rate .289 .265 .283
Noncorporate Sector Tax Rate .331 .336 .328
Owner-Occupied Housing Tax Rate .217 .237 .267
Overall Tax Rate .284 .283 .293
D.All Debt
Corporate Sector Tax Rate -.275 .306 .065
Noncorporate Sector Tax Rate .312 .334 .311
Owner-Occupied Housing Tax Rate .114 .062 .181
Overall Tax Rate .106 .250 .197
E. All Equity
Corporate Sector Tax Rate .553 .491 .474
Noncorporate Sector Tax Rete .305 .323 .309
Owner-Occupied Housing Tax Rate .199 .291 .254
Overall Tax Rate .334 .377 .340
1. Marginal effective total tax rates in each sector, for 4 percent
inflation, firm arbitrage, and a 5 percent net rate of return.ME TT P
.60
Figure 1
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